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INDIANA LAIW JOURNAL
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE-CHANGE OF VENuE.-Litigants in an action to
vacate a default judgment did not make application for a change of judge
after being informed by the judge that he had represented the opposing
litigants in the original proceedings and that he was entitled to attorney's
fees as result thereof. A statutory provision, Burns' Ann. Statutes 1933,
sec. 2-1401, provides for a change of venue upon application of either party
where the judge has been engaged as counsel in a cause prior to election or
appointment, or is otherwise interested in the cause. Plaintiff petitions for
a writ of prohibition alleging that the respondent was disqualified to sit as
judge. Held, petition for writ denied. By proceeding to trial the plaintiff
thereby waived the disqualifications of the respondent.1
There is a conflict in the authorities whether at common law there existed
any ground for the disqualification of a judge.2 However, the common law
maxim that a person cannot be judge of his own cause 3 has been universally
accepted.4 This Yule has been held to apply to direct pecuniary or direct
property interest or to an interest involving some individual right or privilege
in the subject matter of the litigation whereby a liability or pecuniary gain
must occur on the event of the suit. 5 The English courts, 6 and a few
American jurisdictions,7 have followed this elementary maxim with logical
consistency; not giving it a narrow, technical application, but applying it to
all classes of cases. Thus, without a direct statute on the subject, these
courts render a judge incompetent upon a showing of a real possibility of
bias. In practically all of the states, however, there are statutory provisions
by force of which one who has been of counsel in a case may not act as
judge thereof.8 Although there is no direct statute in Indiana which expressly
disqualifies a judge from presiding in any civil case,9 there is an express
I State ex rel. Krodel v. Gilkison (1935), - Ind. -, 198 N. E. 325.
2 Grounds for disqualification of judge recognized in 2 Bacon Abr. p. 621,
Coke Litt. p. 141. Blackstone denies this, stating that "by the laws of England
., in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be refused, but now
the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and justices cannot be chal-
lenged. For the law will nut suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge
who is already sworn to administer impartial justice and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea." 3 Blackstone Comm. (Cooley
4th ed. -), p. 361.
3 Wharton, Legal Maxims (3rd. ed. 1903), p. 101.4 Winters v. Coons (1904), 162 Ind. 26, 69 N. E. 458, State v. Ellis (1916),
184 Ind. 307, 112 N. E. 98, Meyer v. San Diego (1898), 121 Cal. 102, 53 N. E.
434, Pearce v. Atwood (1816), 13 Mass. 324; In re Conant (1907), 102 Me.
477, 67 A. 564.
5 33 Corpus Juris sec. 135, p. 992 and cases cited therein.
6 Queen v. Meyer (1875), 1 0. B. D. 173, Frome United Breweries Co.
v. Bath (1926), A. C. 586.
7 Tampa St. Ry. Co. v. Tampa Suburban R. Co. (1892), 30 Fla. 595, 11
So. 562; State v. Hocker (1894), 34 Fla. 25, 15 So. 581.
8 Bledsoe v. State (1917), 130 Ark. 122, 197 S. W 17, Lassen Ir. Co. v.
Lassen County (1907), 151 Cal. 357, 90 P 709; Curtis v. Wilcox (1889), 174
Mich. 169, 41 N. W 863, Darling v. Pierce (1847), 15 Hun. 542 (N. Y.),
Sewell v. Huffstetler (1921), 83 Fla. 629, 93 So. 162; Stevens v. Hall (1902),
8 Ida. 549, 69 P 282.
9 A judge is prohibited to try "any criminal cause where he has
been of counsel in the cause, either for the state or for the defendant; and
., it shall be the duty of the regular judge to select a special judge
to try such cause." Burns' Ann. Statutes, 1933, sec. 9-1303.
RECENT CASE NOTES
statutory provision which specifies causes for change of venue and the grounds
upon which the change may be obtained. Having been of counsel in a cause
pending before the judge is one of the grounds specified.lO
While a common law right to a change of venue upon certain grounds
has been recognized in some jurisdictions where no complete statute on the
subject exists,1 1 the general view is that this is a statutory privilege which
can be asserted and exercised only in the manner provided by the statute. 1 2
This personal privilege has been granted to a litigant to promote the ends
of justice, and unless abused it is reasonably calculated to secure that aim.
Hence, change of venue statutes should not be employed to delay and obstruct
the progress of litigation. In pursuance of this policy, the statutes are
ordinarily construed to contemplate that a timely application for a change
of venue shall be made.13 A failure to make a timely objection, and volun-
tarily proceeding with the trial of a cause is deemed to be a waiver of the
objection.14 Cases are abundant which declare that "where a party goes to
trial, without objection, before a judge who assumes to act under color of
authority, he cannot after judgment or conviction successfully make the
objection that the judge acted without competent authority in the trial of the
case."
1 5 The disqualifications set out in the change of venue statute are not
regarded as jurisdictional and the judgment of a court so interested is
generally considered erroneous only, and not void, consequently, the objection
might be waived by the parties either expressly or impliedly.16 Since the
causes for change of venue do not expressly forbid a disqualified judge to
act, a party submitting a case before him must be regarded as having waived
any objection when the facts were at all times known to the party.17 Where
the presiding judge discloses his relationship and gives the litigant ample
opportunity to prepare a motion for a change of judge, and the party waives
the objection and declares himself ready for trial, the court should not there-
after be embarrassed by the question.
Although the litigant in the instant case waived the disqualifications of
the respondent to sit as judge in the cause of action, the judge's continuance
10 Burns' Ann. Statutes 1933, sec. 2-1401.
11 Crocker v. Justices (1911), 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369.
12 Neal v. Superior Ct. (1931), 202 Ind. 456, 174 N. E. 732; Bowen v.
Stewart (1891), 128 Ind. 507, 26 N. E. 168; Elliott v. Wallowa City. (1910),
57 Ore. 236, 109 P 130; Osborn v. State (1910), 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W 737
13 O'Neill v. Pyle (1933), 204 Ind. 509, 184 N. E. 776; Thorn v. Silver
(1909), 174 Ind. 504, 89 N. E. 943, Smith v. Smith (1852), 3 Ind. 303, Ickes
v. Kelley (1863), 21 Ind. 72; Kirby v. Union Pacific (1912), 51 Colo. 509,
119 P 1042.
14 Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Ward (1913), 56 Ind. App. 155, 102 N. E.
395, Smith v. Smith (1852), 3 Ind. 303, Howard v. Barbee (1863), 21 Ind.
221, McClelland v. McClelland (1898), 176 Ill. 83, 51 N. E. 559.
15 State v. Lane (1916), 184 Ind. 523, 111 N. E. 616, Perry v. Pernet (1905),
165 Ind. 67, 74 N. E. 609; Crawford v. Lawrence (1900), 154 Ind. 288, 56 N. E.
673, Schlunger v. State (1887), 113 Ind. 295, 296, 15 N. E. 515.
IGAtty. General v. Davenport (1927), 125 Okla. 1, 256 P 340; Conkling
v. Crosby (1925), 29 Ariz. 60, 239 P 506, Phy v. Allen (1925), 115 Or. 168,
236 P 1056, Du Quoin Waterworks Co. v. Parks (1903), 207 Ill. 46, 69
N. E. 587, see Freeman on Judgments (1925, 5th ed.), sec. 330.
17 Kline v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 334, 142 N. E. 713, Carr v. Duhne
(1906), 167 Ind. 76, 78 N. E. 322; Baldwin v. Runyan (1893), 8 Ind. App.
344, 35 N. E. 569- Coltrane v. Templeton (1901), 106 Fed. 370.
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in that capacity was manifestly improper. Hughes, J., properly disapproved
of the professional ethics of the respondent. Regardless of the fact that the
relator did not file a formal application for a change of judge, the respondent,
having represented a party in the original proceedings, should have declined
to act in a judicial capacity. It is the ethical duty of a court to disqualify
himself on his own motion when circumstances are such as may give cause
for suspicion of bias or prejudice.'8
A writ of prohibition is an attack to which a judgment should not be
subjected when the reason for such attack could have been remedied at the
time of trial. A party should not be permitted to sit quietly by and await
the outcome of the trial, and then, in the event of an adverse decision, raise
an objection to the qualifications of the judge. As the relator was fully aware
of the alleged disqualifications it was his imperative duty to object. Having
had an opportunity to request and obtain a change of venue and choosing not
to do so, he must be held to have waived this privilege.19
18Joyce v. Whitney (1877), 57 Ind. 550.
19 Carr v. Duhne (1906), 167 Ind. 76, 78 N. E. 322; Smith v. Amiss
(1902), 30 Ind. App. 530, 66 N. E. 501, Baldwin v. Runyan (1893), 8 Ind.
App. 344, 35 N. E. 569.
